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DEFENSE OF THIRD PERSONS AS EXCUSE FOR HOMICIDE
In the criminal law, self defense is an affirmative defense to homicide. Under
proper circumstances, one is justified in taking the life of another because of the
inherent right of man to protect himself from the unlawful assaults of others.'
Closely related to the right of self defense is the right to defend third persons.This right is not so well defined as the more common one of self defense. That
there is a moral right to assist others in the repulsion of unwarranted assaults
cannot be demed; the problem is under what circumstances can this right be a
legal defense to homicide. This problem admits of two phases, (1) who is capable
of asserting this right and, (2) what can he do under his exercise of it?
(1)

WHO CAN EXERCiSE

Tins Rioirr?

There is some question as to whether this right extends to every person who
chooses to come to the aid of his fellow human or only to persons standing in a
special relationship to the party defended. There are many general statements
that the right to defend another is limited to those related to the one defended
by blood or marmage or to those under the supervision of the defender such as
parent, child, wife, brother or servant.' As a practical matter, in the majority of
the cases, the defender will stand in one of these relationships to the person defended. One is more likely to come to the defense of a relative than to the aid
of a stranger, but, if one has killed while defending a stranger, should he be
refused the protection of the defense? There are jurisdictions which see no such
limitation on the right.4 Which of these viewpoints is the more logical guide?
As a matter of practical effect, in those jurisdictions which deny that there
is any right on the part of a stranger to assist a third person in his defense, there
is yet a way to acquit a defendant when he has killed doing just that. It is generally admitted that one is justified in killing in order to prevent the commission
of an atrocious felony.' This right has been interpreted as the greater right as
compared to the right to assist others in their defense,8 and, therefore, the power
to exercise it has been extended to all persons rather than to persons of a class.
Moreover, some jurisdictions which now impose a class limitation on the right to
defend third persons justify a homicide when it is in the prevention of a violent
felony.' Violent felonies such .as murder, rape and felomous assault have to be
committed unon people. When one intervenes in such a situation and kills in
order to prevent such a felony, is he not also necessarily acting in the defense of
the victim? Conversely, his intention may be solely one of defense of the third
person, and his acts may only incidentally operate to prevent the felony. As-a
matter of practical effect when there is a homicide in the defense of a third person, there is also apt to be an attempt at a felony by the attacker. It is submitted
that it is untenable to rationalize that the defender was not justified in killing

'2 BuiDici, LAw OF CiumE sec. 436 et seq. (1946).
1 WAMREN ON HOMICIDE sec. 161 (1938).
'Forman v. State, 190 Ala. 22, 67 So. 583 (1914); State v. Anderson, 22 N. C.
148, 22 S.E. 2d 271 (1942); State v. Hewitt, 205 S.C. 207, 31 S.E. 2d 257
(1944); 26 Am. Jun. 265.
'People v. Dugas, 310 Ill. 291, 141 N.E. 769 (1923); State v. Hennessy, 29
Nev. 320, 90 P 221 (1907).
1 WARRMN ON HOMICmE sec. 147 (1938).
'A homicide to prevent a violent felony is said to be a killing by the execution of the law while one in the defense of a third person is not. 1 HALE P. C. 484.
Storey v. State, 71 Ala. 329, 340 (1882).
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since he was interposing in behalf of a stranger, but that the fact that the attacker
was about to commit a violent felony saves him from a demal of a defense. Any
person who elects to come to the aid of his fellow man should be protected if he
kills while engaged in the legitimate defense of such third person.' Such defense
is legitimate whenever he reasonably believes that the third person is in danger
of death or great bodily harm, because these are threatened violent felonies.9 So,
if he proceeds with his defense on a theory of defense of third persons, he should
be able to maintain it and should not be required to resort to the other defense
which views him as a prosecutor of the law rather than the defender that he is.
(2) WHAT is =H EXTENT OF Tmis RIGHT?
It has been observed that there is a right of one to come to the defense of a
third party which ought to extend under certain circumstances to any person assuming the role of a protector. The next problem is the extent or that right;
more specifically, what facts are necessary to enable this right to constitute a perfect defense when one coming to the aid of another kills in the process?
There are two distinct theories as to the extent of this right? The first and
the majority rule is that the slayer can have no better defense than the defended
party would have had or that the defender "stands in the shoes of the, third
party."'" When one has killed in a jurisdiction anlying this view, he does not
have a perfect defense if the defender was at fault in bringing about the difficulty
or if the defender was actually the agressor.'1 The opposing theory is that one is
justified in the homicide if the defender, acting as a reasonable man, believed
that the person defended was in immediate danger of death or great bodily harm
and that the affray was not due to that person s own wrongdoing.'
In the )unsdictions adopting the second and minority theory, one may successfully defend a
prosecution for criminal homicide when the party defended has been guilty of
unlawful conduct in bringing about the combat or was actually the attacker since
the defense consists of the reasonable belief in the mind of the defender, not the
actual state of facts.
Those jurisdictions following the majority rule invariably reach for the argument that to acquit a defendant who has had a reasonable belief that the third
party was without fault can, in instances, result in the killing of an innocent man
without any criminal liability. Thus, in More v. State, 3 the court sustains its
position of applying this narrow rule with the classic example:
"It may be said that this rule may in exceptional circumstances work hardship; however, the opposite rule would allow an
innocent man who had been forced to strike in self defense to be
killed with impunity merely because appearances happened to be
against him at the moment a relative of his antagonist reached the
8

MAY, CRIMINAL LAW sec. 62 (4th ed. 1938).
Self defense involves fear of death or grievous bodily harm. Each of these
is fear0 of a violent felony-the first that of homicide, the second that of mayhem.
' Humphnes v. State, 28 Ala. App. 159, 181 So. 309 (1938); Turner v. State
128 Ark. 565, 195 S.W 5 (1917); Pacheco v. People, 96 Col. 401, 43 P 2d 165
(1930); State v. Anderson, 222 N. C. 148, 22 S.E. 2d 271 (1942); State v. Francis, 152 S. C. 17, 149 S.E. 348 (1929); Cooper v. State, 123 Tenn. 37, 138 S.W
826, 851 (1911); 31 W VA. LAW Q. 74.
I See cases in note 10, supra.
'-State v. Harper, 149 Mo. 514, 51 S.W 89 (1899).
'325 Okla. Cr. 151, 219 P. 175, 178 (192,3).
'
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scene of the conflict. We deem it our duty to enforce rather than
to relax the rule, which admits of no justification for taking human
life except necessity."
It is to be observed that this argument makes no reference to any crnunality
on the part of the defender. The sole theme is that an innocent man has been
slain and someone ought to be punished for it, but the law does not always punish for the intentional killing of an innocent man. When the court refers to the
rule which admits of no justification for taking human life except necessity, it is
alluding, apparently in this instance, to the rule that one may kill to prevent the
commission of a violent felony when there is no other apparent method of prevention with a reasonable belief that such an act is imminently to be perpetrated 1 '
Under this rule, the death of an innocent man is not always avenged by the law
since the basis of the defense is a reasonable belief that a felony is about to be
committed."1
Those jurisdictions following the minority rule recognize that there should
be additional factors for criminal liability other than the intentional killing of an
innocent man.' A criminal intent or mind is an essential element of a criminal
homicide in the absence of a criminal negligence."l Why, then, should one who
under a mistake of fact formed without negligence be submitted to criminal
liability' It may be argued that criminal liability in such a situation will result in
the prevention of deaths of innocent men at the hands of defenders who make mstakes of fact. It has been observed, however, that criminal courts cannot prevent
such mistakes except in a most general way by pronouncements which are not
widely read." Furthermore, if persons fail to act because of a lack of absolute
certainty as to the state of facts, are not innocent men apt to be killed for lack
of defenders?
It is submitted that to refuse the defense to one who has killed with a reasonable belief that the defended was in immediate danger of death or great bodily
harm without fault on his part is an unsound encroachment upon fundamental
principles of criminal liability. The obvious justice afforded by the rule is recog0
nized in the case of Guffee v. State"
where the lower court had instructed that the
right of one to defend his brother was equal to that but no more than the brother s
right of self defense. In condemnation of the instruction, the court stated:
"The inherent vice of this extract from the charge of the
court is, that it bound appellant to Ins brother with hooks of steel,
and made him answerable for the acts of Ins brother, as well as for
his own, without regard to the motive or intent, which may have been
totally dissimilar in the breast of each. Throughout the transaction
the (defended) may have been actuated by a malicious
motive, a heart regardless of social duty and fatally bent on mischief,
while the intent of the appellant may have been of a wholly different
nature and character. Can it be said that in that event the same
degree of culpability must attach to him as if his purpose had been
See Collegina v. State, 9 Okla. Cr. 425, 182 P. 375, 379 (1913).

'1 WAREN ON Ho MucmE sec. 147 (1938).
" See note, 72 U. OF PA. LAw RxvrEw 325 (1924).

" A mistake of fact formed without fault or negligence prevents the formatio
of a criminal
intent. 1 BisHoP, CRImiNAL LAW see. 301, 303 (9th ed. 1923).
'0 MAY, CRIMINAL LAW, Op. cit. supra note 8, see. 62.
108

Tex. Cr. App. 187, 206 (1880).
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the same as that of his brother? If so, one of the fundamental pnnciples of criminal jurisprudence must be ignored and set at naught.
If my brother seeks out his enemy upon the public highway with a
view to slay him, and I, ignorant of his design as well as the cause
of the difficulty and how it originated, but seeing him hotly engaged
and the fortune of the fight turung against him, and realizing that
he is in imminent danger of life or limb, rush to his rescue, and strike
down his antagonist in order to save his life, must I, under such circumstances, be adjudged guilty of murder with express malice, merely
because my brother would be so adjudged in case he had inflicted the
mortal blow? If the law is so written in the books, we have failed to
discover it. Nature has written her own law differently in the hearts,
of men."
Since the "stand in the shoes" rule in defense of third persons is in conflict with
the fundamental principle of criminal law that one cannot be guilty of criminal
homicide in the absence of criminal intent or negligence, it is submitted that it
should yield to the rule that one may kill in the defense of a third person when
he has a reasonable belief that the person defended is in imminent peril of death
or great bodily harm without fault on his own part.
JAMES DANIEL COMNE-rE

INSANITY AS A DEFENSE TO CRIME
If one who is subjected to criminal prosecution proves to the satisfaction of
the jury that he was insane at the time of the commission of the act, he will stand
absolved from all criminal liability. If the crime is one which requires a criminal
intent, the defense of insanity negatives the existence of such intent.
In the preponderance of crimes, two elements are essential for convictionact and intent. Except in "attempts," an act is not susceptible to a great degree
of uncertainty, it is there to be seen and needs oalv to be proved to the jury. The
intent or mental element of crime is an entirely different proposition. It can be
seen by no one, and the boundaries of mentality or insanity are necessarily susceptible to much uncertainty. That the subjective element of crime is such an
elusive thing is probably the reason that insanity is an affirmative defense to crime
in about twenty-two states.' In the jurisdictions adhering to this majority rule,
the defendant has the burden of proof of convincing the jury that he was insane,
rather than the lighter burden of going forward with the evidence on insanity.
Perhaps the reason behind this rule is that it is a matter of popular and judicial
belief that many persons relying on the defense of insanity are perfectly sane,
and that if the ultimate burden of proof of sanity were on the prosecution, it
would afford an easy avenue of escape to the guilty. However, the doctrine of
mens rea, which is a fundamental concept in the criminal law, stands unequivocally
for the proposition that a mental element is an indispensable component of the
majority of crimes. If the doctrine of mens rea is as fundamental as it is pur'Nineteen states and the Federal courts place the burden of pro6f on the
WEIHOFEN, INSANITY 'AS A DEFENSE IN CRLmnINAL LAW 151, 158
(1933). MAY, Cmu ii.AL LAw see. 47 (4th ed. 1938).
"Williamson v. Norris, 1 Q. B. 7 (1899)" 1 BIsHoP, CRImiNAL LAw sec. 287
(9th ed. 1923). For a complete analysis of the doctrine, see Sayre, Men s Rea, 45
HAnv. L. REv. 974 (1932).

prosecution.

